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Abstract
We provide a new experimental investigation of the neutrality theorem of Warr
(1983), who states ”when a single public good is provided at positive levels by pri-
vate individuals, its provision is unaﬀected by a redistribution of income”. Instead
of comparing diﬀerent income distributions across groups as Chan et al. (1996),
in our experiment the total group endowment is redistributed after a 10 rounds
sequence. We compare an unequalizing redistribution (EI) and an equalizing re-
distribution (IE), to two benchmark treatments for which the 10 rounds sequence
is repeated, either with an equal distribution (EE) or an unequal distribution (II).
The constituent game has a unique interior dominant strategy equilibrium. Our
data support the neutrality theorem (after controlling for the restart eﬀect): re-
distribution has no eﬀect on the total amount of public good in none of the tested
treatments. However, the analysis of individual behavior shows that ”poor” subjects
over-contribute with respect to their Nash-contribution, while ”rich” subjects tend
to play their Nash-contribution or under-contribute slightly. Furthermore, after a
redistribution, subjects react asymetrically: subjects who get poorer reduce their
contribution of a larger amount than the amount of contribution added by subjects
who become richer. And it is shown that the latter do not react enough to the
redistribution.
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11 Introduction
Warr (1983) demonstrated that a redistribution of income has no eﬀect on the private
provision of a public good when a single public good is provided (positively) by private
individuals. His ”neutrality theorem” was extended to more than one public good by
Bergstrom, Blume & Varian (1986), BBV thereafter. BBV also showed that if the redis-
tribution of income aﬀects the number of contributors, the amount of public good provided
might either increase or decrease, depending on the direction of the redistribution. In-
come redistribution from rich to poor individuals can lead to a decrease in the amount
of voluntarily provided public goods. Symmetrically, a redistribution from poor to rich,
might lead to exactly the opposite outcome. Although both these predictions might seem
counter-intuitive, they are in line with recent experimental ﬁndings about inequality aver-
sion and reciprocal behavior (e.f. Rabin 1993, Fehr & Schmidt 1999, Fischbacher et al.
2001). For instance, individuals who become richer after income redistribution contribute
larger amounts to the public goods, reducing thereby the initial income inequality. A sim-
ilar argument holds for individuals who become poorer. However in BBV’s theory, the
tendency towards equalization of ﬁnal net incomes, is obtained under standard behav-
ioral assumptions, i.e. selﬁsh utility maximization. The inequality generated by income
redistribution is mitigated by unequal voluntary contributions between rich and poor.
These theoretical ﬁndings raise interesting questions from a behavioral point of view.
Is it the case that individuals who become richer contribute more, and individuals who
become poorer contritute less ? And if true, to what extent do these adjustements cancel
out so that neutrality is conﬁrmed ? In this paper, we try to provide answers to these
questions, by relying on an experiment based on a voluntary contribution game, in which
we implement income redistribution. Our focus is on the neutrality issue raised by Warr’s
paper.
The only experimental study we are aware oﬀ to test this theory was run by Chan
et al. (1996). They found that more inequality leads to more public good provision,
consistent with BBV (1986). Furthermore at the individual level, in contrast to inequality
aversion theories, they observed that the poor tend to over-contribute while the rich tend
2to under-contribute. But clearly more data is needed to get a clear understanding of
how people adjust their contribution after an income redistribution. Chan et al. (1996)
actually compared groups of subjects facing diﬀerent income distributions, ranging from
low to high inequality, keeping the aggregate income constant. They did not address the
question how a given subject reacts to an income redistribution, which was the original
question raised in Warr (1983) and BBV (1996). In order to justify our departure from
their experimental design, it is useful to provide some details about their experiment.
The experiment by Chan et al. (1996) involved groups of 3 subjects (1 rich and 2
poors), which they compare to a benchmark treatment, consisting of groups of 3 subjects
with equal endowments. For each treatment income distribution was common knowledge
and remained unchanged over the 15 rounds of their contribution game. While the con-
stituent game admits a unique Nash equilibrium in agregate group contribution, multiple
contribution vectors are compatible with the agregate contribution (due to the integer
values restrictions). The multiplicity of Nash equilibria in individual contributions raises
therefore a coordination issue, which might possibly have aﬀected subjects’ behavior.
Their model5 predicts that the rich player contributes more than poor players, that
”very poor” players contribute zero, and therefore a redistribution from the very poor to
the rich increases the level of the public good. If all players contribute a positive amount
before and after the redistribution, the level of the public good will be unaﬀected by
redistribution. Besides the coordination issue already mentioned, the model predicts an
”extreme” equilibrium in the high inequality treatment: only the rich player contributes.
Instead of playing Nash, the rich subject might have felt a moral obligation to contribute
with respect to the ”very poor” subjects.
In order to overcome the coordination issue raised by multiple equilibria in individual
contributions, and to allow for a direct test of redistribution, in the spirit of Warr (1983)
and BBV (1986), we propose a new experimental design. First, we choose a quadratic pay-
oﬀ function which implies a unique dominant strategies equilibrium (Keser, 1996). Under
5Each player’s utility is given by: ui(xi,g) = xi + g + xig where xi corresponds to private goods
consumption and g =
Pn
i=1 wi − xi to the consumption of the public good. Player i’s budget constraint




3suitable restrictions only interior solutions exist for a wide range of incomes. Therefore
the solutions are clearly independent from income, which establishes directly Warr’s re-
sult. Second, we choose a within-subject design, for which each subject faces two income
distributions. This is done by letting each group play two sequences of 10 rounds. After
an initial 10-rounds sequence, income is redistributed and a second 10-rounds sequence is
played out. This setting allows us to study the eﬀect of income redistribution within each
group, and to identify the reaction of players who become poorer or richer. Furthermore,
we consider two kinds of redistributions: an unequalizing redistribution and an equalizing
redistribution. In the ﬁrst case, players belonging to a given group have the same en-
dowment in the initial sequence, but face a unequal distribution in the second sequence.
In contrast, the equalizing redistribution starts with an unequal distribution in the ﬁrst
sequence and moves to an egalitarian distribution of income in the second sequence. The
comparison of these treatments to the two benchmark treatments (two sequences with
uniform income distribution and two sequences with unequal distributions) allows us to
isolate the eﬀect of the ordering of the sequences. Finally the benchmark treatments allow
us to wipe out the so-called ”restart eﬀect” (Andreoni, 1988, Croson, 1996) that might
be involved when a new sequence is started unexpectedly for the subjects.
Our main ﬁndings can be summarized as follows : i) redistribution does not aﬀect the
average amount of public good provided, in accordance with the neutrality theorem of
Warr and BBV, ii) subjects who become richer after redistribution tend to under-react, i.e.
they increase their contribution but less than predicted, and iii) after redistribution sub-
jects who become poorer tend to over-contribute with respect to their Nash-contribution
while subjects who become richer either contribute at their Nash level or slightly below.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we present the theoretical
models of Warr (1983) and Bergstrom, Blume & Varian (1986) and their testable predic-
tions. Section 3 introduces our experimental design. In section 4 we present our results.
Section 5 concludes.
42 The neutrality theorem
Two fundamental papers deal with the eﬀect of a redistribution of income on the voluntary
contribution to a public good. At ﬁrst, Warr (1983) concludes in a quite general model
that when a single public good is privately provided at positive levels by each individual,
an inﬁnitesimal redistribution of income does not aﬀect the private provision of the public
good. On the basis of this model, Bergstrom, Blume & Varian (1986) extend the result
to non-inﬁnitesimal variations of income and several public goods. They also derive some
interesting results concerning the case where the redistribution of income aﬀects the initial
set of contributors, i.e. the set of contributors before redistribution. In particular, they
show that a redistribution of income from poor individuals to rich individuals increases the
private provision of the public good whenever the poor individuals were not contributing
before redistribution.
The neutrality theorem of Warr (1983) formally states that ”[w]hen a single public
good is provided at positive levels by private individuals, its provision is unaﬀected by a
redistribution of income”. This result holds despite preference heterogeneity in the group
of agents, for instance, for heterogeneous marginal propensities to contribute to the public
good.
Warr’s result applies when ”individuals behave as atomistic utility maximizers in the
determination of their provision of a single public good, and where this result is an interior
solution to their utility maximization problem”. We provide a brief sketch of the model,
underlying the central hypotheses, in order to justify the choices for our experimental
design. The model assumes n consumers and m private goods. There is a single public
good, the amount of which is noted g =
Pn
i=1 gi where gi is the private contribution by
agent i. Utility functions ui(ci,g)6 diﬀer among agents. Let wi be the exogenous income
for agent i, p the price vector of private goods and q the price of the public good. The
model assumes that each individual behaves as a selﬁsh utility maximizer. A key property
is that each individual contributes a striclty positive amount to the the public good, i.e.
the solution of the maximization program admits a unique interior solution.
The Nash-equilibrium corresponds to a level of public good provision that is inferior
6They are strictly quasi-concave, twice diﬀerentiable and increasing in all arguments.
5to the Pareto-optimal level. Warr shows that the aggregate demand function for the
public good depends only on p,q and w (where w is aggregate income), but not on the
distribution of income. In other words, whatever the income distribution, as long as
aggregate income is unchanged, the amount of public good will be constant7. Identically
the result can be restated in terms of aggregate demands for private goods. The latter
are functions of p, q and w. Since only aggregate income matters, as demonstrated by
Warr, redistribution leaving aggregate income unchanged will generate the same demands
for private goods. The intuition behind the result is that agents maximise their utility
by choosing optimally their level of consumption of private goods. Their contribution to
the public good is therefore ”residual”. An agent who becomes richer after redistribution
spends his extra-income by increasing his contribution to the public good by the same
amount. In contrast, an agent who becomes poorer will cut his contribution by the exact
amount of his income reduction. As far as his private consumption is not aﬀectd by his
income reduction, the increased contribution by the rich is perfectly oﬀset by the reduced
contribution of the poor. Seen from the traditional demand side for private goods, as
long as redistribution does not aﬀect the individual demand functions for private goods,
redistribution has no eﬀect on relative prices and therefore the individual consumption of
private goods remains unchanged as well as the agregate contribution to the public good.
Furthermore, each individual has exactly the same level of utility before and after income
redistribution.
Warr’s result depends crucially on the following assumptions : i) each agent is a ”con-
tributor” before the redistribution occurs , i.e. he contributes a strictly positive amount
to the public good , ii) he consumes at least one private good and iii) variations of in-
come are inﬁnitesimal. BBV (1986) consider the more general case where redistribution
of income implies non-inﬁnitesimal variations of income and which might aﬀect the set
of initial contributors, i.e. after redistribution some of the former non-contributors might
become contributors and some of the former contributors might become non-contributors.
Their main new assumption is that the redistribution of income among the contributing
agents does not lead -at the individual level- to losses that are larger than the original
7Warr considers inﬁnitesimal variations of income.
6contribution for each consumer. If this assumption is satisﬁed and consumers’preferences
are convex, ”each consumer consumes the same amount of the public good and the private
good that he did before the redistribution”. Moreover, BBV also show that their result can
be extended to a public good that is a function of the individual contribution8, ”to more
general solution concepts than that of Nash equilibrium” and ”to more than one public
good”.
They only insist on one restriction on this neutrality result. ”The result is sensitive to
the assumption that utility depends only on private consumption and the amount of the
public good”. If we introduce other arguments, the neutrality theorem will not apply for
all functional forms of the utility.
3 Experimental design
In this section we describe our experimental design, by presenting the underlying game,
the practical procedures that were implemented in the lab and the treatments that we
chose for testing the neutrality theorem.
3.1 The contribution game
In order to avoid diﬃculties due to the multiplicity of equilibria, like in Chan et al. (1996),










where xi represents player i’s investment in the private account and gi = wi−xi her invest-
ment in the collective account. It is easy to see that player i’s optimal consumption of pri-
vate goods is independent of his income, since :
∂Ui
∂xi = 0 ⇔ 41−2xi−15 = 0 ⇔ x∗
i = 13,∀i
and ∀wi ≥ 13.
8”[...] there is no loss of generality in restricting ouselves to a public good which is a sum of the
individual contributions. If instead G = f(Σn
i=1gi), utility would take the form ui(xi,f(G)) which is still
of the appropriate form.”, BBV (1986), pp. 31.
7With our speciﬁcation, the ”residual” contributions to the public good are equal to
g∗
i = wi−13 ∀i. Therefore, if wi > 13 is satisﬁed for all players before and after redistribu-
tion, each player will invest a strictly positive amount in the public account. Conversely,
the equilibrium contribution to the public account depends only on income. The unique
interior Nash equilibrium is a dominant strategies equilibrium with g∗
i = 2 if ωi = 15,
g∗
i = 7 if ωi = 20 and g∗
i = 12 if ωi = 25. In terms of ﬁnal payoﬀs, there is theoretically no
diﬀerence between rich and poor players. At equilibrium, starting from an unequal dis-
tribution, ﬁnal payoﬀs are theoretically equally distributed. In fact, at equilibrium poor
contribute less than rich after having satisﬁed their private consumption, and the public
good provided is equally distributed among group members. Similarly, at the optimum
level of public good provision - which is reached whenever each group member contributes
her endowment - payoﬀs are also equalized within the group. This means that inequality
aversion cannot account for the observed departure from equilibrium play, nor from the
optimum9.
The constituent game is based on the above payoﬀ function, although players were
not given this formula in the instructions. Instead, each subject received a payoﬀ table
indicating the marginal payoﬀ for each token invested in the private account as well as the
total payoﬀ as a function of the number of tokens invested in the private account. They
were aware that any token invested in the public account gave a payoﬀ of 15 points (for
the investor as well as for each other member of the group).
3.2 Practical procedures
We conducted the experiment in a computerized laboratory at the Universit´ e de Mont-
pellier 1, with the software z-Tree (Fischbascher, 2007). We run 7 sessions involving 16
subjects and 2 sessions involving 8 subjects. The 128 subjects were randomly selected from
a pool of student-subjects containing more than 1 000 volunteers from the Universities of
Montpellier. Upon arriving at the experimental lab, subjects were randomly assigned to
groups of 4 persons which remained ﬁxed for the whole session. The experiment consisted
9TBC Fehr & Schmidt.
8in 20 rounds of play of the constituent game. Written instructions were provided for the
ﬁrst ten rounds only. In each round subjects were asked to invest each of their tokens in a
private account or in a public account. At the end of each round the following information
was displayed on each subject’s computer screen : the amount he invested in each of the
two accounts, the total contribution to the public account by the group, his earning from
the private account, his earning from the public account and his total earnings for that
round. Furthermore, the record of previous rounds was also on display.
Subjects were unaware that a second sequence of 10 rounds would be played after the
ﬁrst 10-rounds sequence which was announced in the instructions. At the end of the
tenth round, a new sequence of 10 rounds was publicly announced. Subjects were given a
new set of instructions, which emphasized the changes with respect to the ﬁrst sequence,
namely the new income distribution among the group members. Each independent group
was endowed with 80 tokens. The 80 tokens were split between the four players in an
egalitarian way in one of the sequences (20 tokens per player) and in an inegalitarian way
in the other sequence (two players received 15 tokens and two players received 25 tokens).
We chose not to announce the redistribution at the beginning of the experiment, in
order to avoid uncontrolled eﬀects that could have been generated by diﬀering expectations
accross subjects about future endowment after the redistribution. If subjects are more or
less optimistic (or pessimistic) about their future income, their contribution to the public
good in the ﬁrst sequence could have been aﬀected. Because of our choice of an unexpected
restart of a new sequence after the tenth round of the ﬁrst sequence, a restart-eﬀect might
be present in our data. Such eﬀect was observed earlier by Andreoni (1988) and Croson
(1996) under similar circumstances: restarting a new sequence in ﬁxed groups after the
last round of the announced initial sequence, tends to increase sharply the contributions
of the beginning of the new sequence.
93.3 Treatments
To test the neutrality theorem, we implemented four treatments involving two sequences
of 10 repetitions of the constituent game: two benchmark treatments (without redistri-
bution) and two test treatments (with redistribution). The two benchmark treatments
are introduced to isolate the restart eﬀect: one for the equal endowment distribution and
one for the unequal endowment distribution. For the two test treatments a redistribution
of the group tokens endowment was implemened after the ﬁrst sequence. One of the test
treatments started with a sequence of equal distribution and introduced a second sequence
with unequal distribution. In the second test treatment, the order of sequences was re-
versed. The distribution of tokens was common knowledge. Subjects were paid according
to their accumulated number of points in one of the two sequences, which was randomly
chosen at the end of the session to be paid out for real. Note that this procedure diﬀers
from other experiments having a restart of the game (Andreoni, 1988 ; Croson, 1996). We
choose this randomly payment procedure to avoid wealth and anticipation eﬀects. The
experimental design is summarized in tables 1 and 2.
[Table 1 about here.]
[Table 2 about here.]
To control for the restart eﬀect, we compare the benchmark treatments without redis-
tribution across sequences to the test treatments which involve redistribution after the ﬁrst
sequence: without ambiguity, the benchmark treatments are labelled Equality-Equality
(EE) and Inequality-Inequality (II) while the test treatments are labelled Equality-Inequality
(EI) and Inequality-Equality (IE), in the order of sequences. For the presentation of the
result we use the term ”round” or ”period” indiﬀerently.
4 Results
Our experimental design allows us to make within-treatment comparisons as well as
accross-treatment comparisons. Of course we are mainly concerned with the within anal-
10ysis in order to account for the redistribution eﬀect.
Before presenting our main result, we start with a description of the data, and the pre-
sentation of some preliminary results which allow us to guarantee that our main result is
not the outcome of some particularities of our data set. Unless otherwise speciﬁed, all of
our tests are two-sided at the 5% signiﬁcance level.
4.1 Data
We collected 8 independent data per period for each treatment (8 groups of 4 subjects
per treatment).
A ﬁrst insight of our data is given by ﬁgures 1 and 2 that describe the average contri-
butions for test treatments according to endowments. Similar ﬁgures for the benchmark
treatments can be found in appendix A.
[Figure 1 about here.]
[Figure 2 about here.]




Before testing the potential eﬀect of the redistribution, some preliminary tests10 are re-
quired in order to guarantee that our samples are homogeneous, i.e. that groups involved
in the same game behaved the same way. We perform such a test only on the ﬁrst sequence
of each treatment by comparing the ﬁrst ten periods average contributions of each group.
The Mann-Withney test does not detect any signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the ﬁrst ten
periods of the EI treatment and the ﬁrst ten periods of its benchmark, the EE treatment
10We used the software R to analyse our data. This software is available at http://CRAN.R-project.
org/doc/FAQ/R-FAQ.html
11(p-value = 0.753). Similarly, there is no signiﬁcant diﬀerence in average contribution be-
tween the ﬁrst ten periods of the IE treatment and the ﬁrst ten periods of its benchmark,
the II treatment (p-value = 0.329). Note that since we test for the agregate contribution
of the group, we do not distinguish between rich and poor subjects. We conclude therefore
that for sequence 1, in our two test treatments, EI and IE, the subjects behave as in the
corresponding benchmark treatments, EE and II respectively. We therefore assume that
observed diﬀerences in the second sequence are due to redistribution, acknowledging for
the restart eﬀect. Since sequence 1 group behavior does not diﬀer between the test and the
benchmark treatments, we pool the sequence 1 data for the treatments EE and EI, and
likewise for the sequence 1 data for the treatments IE and II, to test for diﬀerence between
equality and inequality treatments. There is no signiﬁcant diﬀerence in average contri-
butions between equal and unequal income distributions, according to a Mann-Withney
test (p-value = 0.851), a result which is consistent with Chan et al.’s (1996) ﬁndings.
The following sections check the compatibility of our data with standard results of the
experimental literature on public goods.
4.2.2 Over-contribution
A major ﬁnding of public goods experiments - with and without interior equilibria - is
that most subjects over-contribute to the public good. Figures 1 to 4 show the average
group over-contribution with respect to the Nash-contribution (7 tokens). More details
are provided in tables 8 and 9 (see appendix B) which show the average group contribution
for each of the 20 periods for each treatment.
Result 1. Over-contribution is frequent but not always signiﬁcant.
Support for result 1. Average contributions in all groups and all periods are larger
than 7 for each treatment (8.74 for EE, 10.07 for II, 9.62 for EI and 8.47 for IE). Note that
we only consider the group contribution for the inegalitarian sequences of treatments, with-
out distinguishing between rich and poor subjects. While we observe over-contribution in
our data it is not always signiﬁcant. Table 3 illustrates this result.
12[Table 3 about here.]
Overcontribution is signiﬁcant for three of the sequences out of 8 (Binomial test).
Comment. The above observations are compatible with earlier ﬁnding (see Sefton &
Steinberg, 1995; Keser, 1996; Laury & Holt, 1998; Willinger & Ziegelmeyer, 2001) that
over-contribution is not always signiﬁcant with interior equilibria. In our experiment it
can be explained to some extent by the fact that some groups strongly over-contribute
on average, while others are closer to the Nash prediction or slightly under-contribute
(see table 8, showing the average contribution per group for the ﬁrst sequence of each
treatment).
Result 2. Poor subjects over-contribute while rich subjects Nash-
contribute as predicted.
Support for result 2. (see table 4)
Result 3. After an equalizing redistribution of income, former poor sub-
jects continue to over-contribute and former rich subjects continue to Nash-
contribute.
Support for result 3. Inegalitarian sequences allow us to distinguish between poor
and rich subjects and compare their amount of over-contribution. Figures 2 to 4 illustrate
average contributions of poor and rich subjects following their Nash Equilibrium (2 tokens
for poor subjects and 12 tokens for rich subjects). Table 4 details the results of our
binomial test on the over-contribution of poor and rich subjects.
[Table 4 about here.]
To build our test, we compute the average contribution of the two poor and the two
rich subjects separately for each group and compare each of them to its Nash-prediction:
2 tokens for poor subjects and 12 tokens for rich subjects. Moreover, we can distinguish
13the average contribution of the former poor subjects to the average contribution of the
former rich subjects in the second egalitarian sequence of treatment IE, to detect eventual
changes in overcontribution rates.
Comment on results 2 and 3. Table 4 shows a remarkable diﬀerence in contribu-
tion behavior between rich and poor. Although on average both types of subjects over-
contribute with respect to their Nash contribution, over-contribution is signiﬁcant only
for poor subjects. As can be seen from table 4 in every sequence with unequal distri-
bution11, one observes that rich subjects do not contribute signiﬁcantly more than their
Nash-contribution while poor subjects always over-contribute on average. We conclude
therefore that over-contribution asymmetry between rich and poor is not generated by
the redistribution of income as such, but merely by the existence of an unequal distribu-
tion at the outset of a sequence.
What kind of explanation can be provided for such asymmetry ? The ”strength of the so-
cial dilemma” might be perceived diﬀerently between rich and poor. Willinger & Ziegelme-
yer (2001) showed that the stronger the social dilemma the larger the average overcon-
tribution. The strength of the social dilemma is deﬁned as the diﬀerence between the
equilibrium and the optimum level of contribution. In all of our treatments, and whatever
the subjects’ income, this diﬀerence is always a constant (equal to 13 tokens). Never-
theless, in relative terms, poor subjects have to contribute a very low fraction of their
income to reach their equilibrium contribution level (2/15 = 13.33% of their endowment)
whereas rich subjects contribute a relatively large fraction of their endowment at equilib-
rium (12/25 = 48% of their endowment). Subjects who needed to contribute a low fraction
of their endowment to reach their Nash equilibrium (the poor) might have perceived a
relatively stronger social dilemma, than the richer subjects who contribute about half
their endowment at their Nash equilibrium.
11In sequence 1 of treatment IE, sequence 2 of treatment EI and sequences 1 and 2 of treatment II.
144.2.3 Decay of the average contribution
A stylized fact of voluntary contribution experiments, is the decline of the average con-
tribution over time. This fact is well established in linear public goods experiments (see
Laury, Walker & Williams, 1999; Laury & Holt, 1998) but also in public goods experi-
ments with a unique interior Nash-equilibrium, as in Keser (1996).
However, the decay is much less pronounced with an interior Nash equilibrium than in lin-
ear public goods experiments (Keser, 1996; Willinger & Ziegelmeyer, 2001). Furthermore,
early declines are often followed by temporary increases, the decay becoming sharper
towards the ﬁnal rounds.
Result 4. The average contribution declines slightly over time.
Support for result 4. See our econometric analysis hereafter.
Comment. Our data reveals a slight decrease in average contributions over the 10
rounds of each sequence. The decline is much less pronounced and much slower than
in standard linear public good experiments, in accordance with other experiments on
interior Nash equilibria (Keser, 1996; Willinger & Ziegelmeyer, 2001). A strong end eﬀect,
resulting in a sharp decline towards the end, was also found in these experiments. We
observe the same pattern but far less pronounced, probably because we had only 10
rounds per sequence in contrast to the previously cited experiments which had 20 ore
more rounds.
4.2.4 The restart eﬀect
Result 5. There is no signiﬁcant restart eﬀect in the benchmark treat-
ments.
Support for result 5. We ﬁrst look for an eventual restart eﬀect in treatments without
redistribution (EE and II). For each of these treatments, we compare the average contri-
bution of period 11 (ﬁrst period of sequence 2) and the average contribution of period 10
15(last period of sequence 1) at the group level. If the average contribution of period 11 is
signiﬁcantly larger than for period 10 we can reject the null hypothesis of no restart eﬀect
(the null hypothesis is that the average contribution of period 11 is equal or lower than in
period 10). According to the Wilcoxon signed rank test there is no signiﬁcant diﬀerence
between the average group contributions of periods 10 and 11 for the two benchmark
treatments (p-value[EE] = 0.3125 and p-value[II] = 0.9441). Since there is no signiﬁcant
restart eﬀect for the benchmark treatments we tentatively conclude that the same holds
for the test treatments and that any observed diﬀerence after redistribution is attributable
to redistribution eﬀects, and not to the restart eﬀect. We now consider within-subjects
tests in order to isolate the redistribution eﬀect and state our main results.
4.3 Main results
Result 6. Groups with unequal income distributions after redistribution
contribute the same amout than groups with equal income distribution.
Support for result 6. Our accross treatment comparisons conﬁrm the neutrality of
the redistribution at the collective level as predicted by Warr. We run a Wilcoxon Mann-
Whitney test on the average group contributions observed in sequence 2 of treatments
that have the same initial sequence. Both tests conﬁrm that there is no diﬀerence in
contribution between the average group contributions of second sequences of treatments
having the same ﬁrst sequence (EE vs. EI: p-value = 0.5054 and II vs. IE: p-value =
0.2698). While the restart eﬀect can be isolated in the EE and the II treatments, we
cannot control for it in the EI and the IE treatments. We therefore need to assume that
the restart eﬀect is independent of redistribution, i.e. there is no interaction between
redistribution and restarting a new sequence.
Furthermore, the within-subjects tests conﬁrm that groups contribute on average the
same amount before and after redistribution, that is sum up in result 7.
16Result 7. The average contribution of sequence 1 is equal to the average
contribution of sequence 2 for all treatments.
Support for result 7. We run a Wilcoxon signed rank test to compare the average
group contribution of the ﬁrst sequence with the average group contribution of the second
sequence for each treatment. We ﬁnd that there is no signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the
ﬁrst 10 periods’ average contribution and the last 10 periods’ average contribution, for
the test treatments (p-value[EI] = 0.1953 et p-value[IE] = 0.3828), and for the benchmark
treatments (p-value[EE] = 0.8785 et p-value[II] = 0.6363). We conclude therefore that our
within-subjects analysis, supports Warr’s prediction that income redistribution does not
aﬀect the amount contributed by the group to the public good.
Comment. Our results conﬁrm the ﬁndings of Chan et al. (1996): the average con-
tribution of groups with unequal income distribution does not diﬀer from the average
contribution by groups of equal income distribution. In addition to Chan et al., our
design allows us to test the neutrality theorem of Warr by implementing an eﬀective
redistribution of income within groups. Our results conﬁrm the prediction that, if the
set of contributors is invariant before and after the redistribution, an (un)equalizing re-
distribution is neutral for the provision of a unique public good. This corroborates the
theoretical neutrality result of Warr (1983) at the collective level. However, as discussed
previously, at the individual level subjects react diﬀerently to the redistribution, depend-
ing on whether they get richer or poorer. The behavioral asymetry between rich and poor
is further discussed in the next section.
4.4 Individual adjustment
According to Warr’s prediction, after a redistribution of income, agents who get poorer
decrease their contribution by an amount equal to their income variation, while agents
who get richer increase their contribution by an amount equal to their additional income.
Both adjustments cancel out, leaving the agregate contribution unchanged.
17In accordance with Warr’s prediction, we deﬁne a suject’s individual adjustment as the
diﬀerence between his average contribution before and after redistribution, for treatments
EI and IE. The null hypothesis is that the magnitude of upwards adjustments is equal to
the magnitude of downwards adjustments. Given the parametric setting of our experiment,
these adjustment should be equal to the income variations induced by redistribution, i.e.
+/ − 5 tokens. Although our subjects do not contribute the Nash equilibrium level, we
hypothesize that they adjust their contribution as predicted on the equilibrium path. Our
data reveals that most subjects do adjust their contribution in the predicted direction,
but with a lower magnitude. This is stated as result 8.
Result 8. Subjects under-react to the redistribution (equalizing and un-
equalizing)
Support for result 8 In the EI treatment, subjects who become poorer reduce their
contribution by 4.53 tokens on average, which is not signiﬁcantly lower than 5 (Binomial
test, p-value = 0.363). On the other hand, subjects who become richer increase their con-
tribution by 2.53 tokens on average, which is signiﬁcantly lower than 5 tokens (Binomial
test, p-value = 0.035).
Appendix C, table 9, summarizes the average contribution per subject for the EI
treatment and shows each subject’s average over or under-reaction to the redistribution
(with respect to the predicted Nash-reaction).
We observe a similar pattern for the IE treatment, except that under-reaction is sta-
tistically signiﬁcant for both types of subjects. While former poor subjects should increase
their contribution by 5 tokens and former rich subjects should reduce their contribution
by 5 tokens, we observe a signiﬁcant under-reaction for both types of subjects after the
redistribution in comparison to the predicted Nash reaction. The former poor subjects
increase their contribution by 2.68 tokens on average, which is signiﬁcantly less than 5
(Binomial test, p-value = 0.035) and the former rich subjects reduce their contribution
by 3.71 tokens on average, which is signiﬁcantly less than 5 (Binomial test, p-value =
0.035). Appendix C, table 10, summarizes the average contribution of each subject in the
18IE treatment and his average reaction after redistribution.
The individual reactions to redistribution are signiﬁcantly lower than predicted. Since
the magnitude of these reactions does not diﬀer signﬁcantly between rich and poor, neu-
trality hold.
Comment. A plausible explanation for the subjects’ under-reaction might be found
in the ”anchoring and adjustment” heuristics (Kahneman & Tversky, 1974), according to
which subjects anchor their adjustment decision on their previous contribution, but adjust
insuﬃciently. Subjects who become richer adjust upwards with respect to their previous
contribution while those who become poorer adjust downwards, which is consistent with
our data. According to Epley & Gilovich (2006), who studied the origins of insuﬃcient
adjustments in many contexts, individuals stop adjusting once a satisfying or plausible
value is reached. According to this view, our subjects anchor on their level of contribution
preceding the redistribution (e.g. the average contribution level of the ten ﬁrst periods),
and decide about a satisfactory increase or decrease. If this theory can shed lights on the
under-reaction of subjects, it does not give the intuition of why it is asymetric.
Result 9. Unequalizing redistribution induces asymmetric adjustements :
subjects who become poorer decrease their contribution by a larger amount
than the amount by which subjects who become richer increase their contri-
bution. Asymmetric adjustments are visible but not statistically signiﬁcant
after an equalizing redistribution.
Support for result 9.
[Table 5 about here.]
We compare the adjustment of subjects who become poorer to the adjustment of
subjects who become richer. The adjustment of the poorer is signiﬁcantly larger than the
adjustment of the richer at the 5% level for the EI treatment (one-sided Mann-Whitney
test, p-value = 0.020). There is no asymmetric reactions in the IE treatment (one-sided
Mann-Whitney test, p-value = 0.889). We conclude that individuals who become poorer
19reduce their contribution by a larger amount than individuals who become richer increase
their contribution when an unequalizing redistribution occurs. However, the asymetry is
not strong enough to contradict the neutrality theorem.
Comment. For the EI treatment, the combined eﬀect of insuﬃcient and asymmetric
adjustment between rich and poor is as follows: since both types of subjects tend to
over-contribute in the ﬁrst sequence, the insuﬃcient adjustment for the rich moves their
contribution closer to their new Nash contribution of sequence 2. In contrast, since the
poor subjects underact, they tend to overcontribute relatively more than in sequence 1.
The reason why such asymmetric adjustments between rich and poor occur remains an
open question. We note however, that both types seem to privilege their private account
after the redistribution, in contrast to the prediction of Warr’s theorem.
We summarize our ﬁndings for individual behavior as follows. First, independently of
redistribution, rich subjects tend to Nash-contribute while poor subjects tend to over-
contribute. Second, after redistribution, both types of subjects under-react but asymmet-
rically : subjects who become richer increase their contribution by a lower amount than
subjects who become poorer reduce their contribution. These ﬁndings are at odds with
Warr’s predictions about individual’s reactions to redistribution.
In order to conﬁrm the results of the statistical tests we perform an econometric
analysis in order to capture possible interactions between the independent variables that
account for individual contributions.
4.5 Econometric analysis
In this section we report results of panel-data regressions, in order to account for potential
interactions between all the eﬀects isolated previously using averages. A preliminary
analysis of the data (F-test) rejects the simple pooled regression favouring a panel model.
Furthermore, for most of our model speciﬁcations, ﬁxed eﬀects provide a better ﬁt of
the data than random eﬀects (Hausman test). The model is estimated by the generalized
20least squared method with correction for heteroskedasticity. As in the other sections of the
paper, we require a 5% signiﬁcance level for rejecting the null hypothesis for the estimated
coeﬃcients.
4.5.1 The data
We take as the dependent variable the contribution of subject i to the public account.
Explanatory variables are :
• the contribution of the group at the previous period, named ”contribgpp”;
• the round number, named ”period”;
• a dummy for the sequence of the game (before or stricly after period 10), named
”redib”, taking value 0 before the redistribution and 1 after.
• 8 group dummies named ”group i”, taking value 1 if the subject belongs to the
group and value 0 otherwise.
Group dummys were included in the regression in order to capture a potential group
eﬀect12. Since these variables are almost never signiﬁcant, for none of our treatments, we
do not report the detailed results about these variables.
The regressions are done on the whole data for each treatment. For each treatment
involving unequal income distribution, we analyze separately the data for poor subjects
and the data for rich subjects. In the EI and IE treatments, we consider as a poor (rich)
player, a player who is poor (rich) in at least one of the 2 sequences. We consequently
run 3 separate regressions for the EI, IE and II treatments: one with all subjects, one
with only poor subjects and one with only rich subjects. We obtain the same results
for all these regressions for each treatment. We report therefore, only the results of the
regressions including all subjects.
12In the EE treatment, the dummy ”group” is signiﬁcant for three groups and for one group in the EI
treatment.
214.5.2 General results
The contribution of the group in the previous period (”contribgpp”) has a positive inﬂu-
ence on a subject’s current contribution, in each treatment. Subjects tend to reciprocate
the group contribution observed in the previous period. On average subjects’ contribu-
tions decay over rounds, as shown by the negative sign of the ”time” variable.
Taken together, our results about these two variables (”contribgpp” and ”time”) are in
line with two commonly found facts in experiments on public goods games.
The explanatory variable ”redib” allows to test for two diﬀerent eﬀects : ﬁrst, in the
benchmark treatments, it allows to test for the presence or absence of a restart eﬀect and
second, in the test treatments, it allows to test for the neutrality of redistribution. In the
benchmark treatment we conﬁrm that there is no restart eﬀect since the dummy variable
”redib” is not signiﬁcant. In the test treatment, we conclude that redistribution does not
aﬀect individual contributions for the IE treatment but does so for the EI treatment. The
latter result diconﬁrms our main result supported by non-parametric tests.
The signiﬁcant eﬀect observed for the EI treatment is attributable to the data of
one group of players (group 7). In group 7 almost each subject contributes its entire
endowment from period 5 to the end of the experiment. If we remove the group dummies
from the regression, the variable ”redib” is no longer signiﬁcant. The data of group 7
increasing sharply the standard deviation of group contributions, compared to the other
treatments (see table 8). If we ommit group 7, the standard deviation drops to 1.17,
below the standard deviation of other treatments (see table 8). So high variability in
this treatment is only due to one group whereas the other groups behave quite similarly
contrary to IE treatment. All these factors can explain why the variable ”redib” becomes
signiﬁcant when we introduce the group dummies. Indeed, when we take oﬀ the group 7
and when we do not take the group 1 as a reference, we decrease the signiﬁcance of the
dummy ”redib”.
[Table 6 about here.]
224.5.3 Treatments with unequal endowments
For treatments with unequal endowments we further investigate the eﬀects of subjects’
endowment on her contribution and her over-contribution. Over-contribution is deﬁned
as the diﬀerence between the observed contribution of a subject and his predicted con-
tribution (which depends on his endowment: 2, 7 and 12 for endowments of 15, 20 and
25 respectively). We run two regressions -one for the ”contribution” dependent variable





• ”endowment (x)”, where x = {15,20,25} is the period endowment of the considered
subject. This dummy takes value 1 if the considered subject has an endowment of
x and 0 otherwise. The reference endowment is x = 20 for the EI et IE treatments
and x = 15 for the II treatment.
The II treatment allows us also to study the eﬀect of income inequality. The dummy
”endowment” indicates that subjects with high endowment contribute more but over-
contribute less than subjects with low endowment. These ﬁndings are consistent with our
previous results.
The two test treatments EI and IE allow us to study the eﬀect of the redistribution.
Our regressions conﬁrm the results of our previous analysis. Rich subjects contribute
more than subjects who are endowed with 20 tokens and poor subjects contribute signiﬁ-
cantly less than subjects endowed with 20 tokens, so they adjust their contribution in the
predicted direction after redistribution.
Moreover poor subjects over-contribute the same amount (EI treatment) or more (IE treat-
ment) with respect to subjects endowed with 20 tokens, while rich subjects over-contribute
23signiﬁcantly less than subjects who are endowed with 20 tokens. These ﬁndings conﬁrms
our earlier results:
• After redistribution, subjects adjust their contribution in the right direction. Sub-
jects becoming richer increase their contribution and subjects becoming poorer de-
crease their contribution ;
• but subjects adjust insuﬃciently with respect to Warr’s prediction. This explains
why poor over-contribute more than rich in the EI treatment.
[Table 7 about here.]
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we experimentally investigated the neutrality theorem of Warr (1983) on
the private provision of a public good. According to this theorem a redistribution of
income among contributors to a public good does not aﬀect aggregate contributions to
this public good. We implemented an experimental framework that allows us to make a
real redistribution of income in the course of the experiment. We used a quadratic payoﬀ
function to ensure that there is a unique interior dominant strategies equilibrium. We
controlled for an eventual restart eﬀect after redistribution, which could be a possible
confounding factor. Our data supports the neutrality theorem at the aggregate level: a
redistribution of income among contributors has no signiﬁcant impact on the group level
of contribution to the public good.
However at the individual level, we ﬁnd that poor subjects signiﬁcatively over-contribute
to the public good, whereas rich subjects Nash-contribute. The redistribution of income
does not aﬀect this asymmetric contribution behavior. Furthermore we observe the same
pattern in our unequal income distribution benchmark treatment where no redistribu-
tion was implemented. Consequently, only income inequality explains over-contribution
diﬀerences between rich and poor. Moreover we found that both types of subjects under-
react asymmetrically to redistribution: becoming-poorer subjects adjust more strongly
than becoming-richer subjects. While under-reaction is compatible with the ”anchoring
24and insuﬃcient adjustment” heuristic, asymmetric adjustement between rich and poor
remains puzzling.
Our experiment was a ﬁrst attempt to isolate the eﬀects of income redistribution on
group and individual contributions. We focused on the particular outcome where redistri-
bution is neutral. It would be interesting to contrast these ﬁndings to other treatments
for which redistribution aﬀects the set of contributors, and therefore neutrality no longer
holds (see BBV). This will be a major agenda for future research.
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31Figure 3: Average contribution EE treatment
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32Figure 4: Average contribution II treatment
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35Table 2: Equality-Inequality (EI) and Inequality-Equality (IE) treatments











aConsistent with the neutrality result of Warr and the BBV model.
bConsistent with the proposition (i) of the theorem 4 of the BBV model.
36Table 3: Aggregate over-contribution (Binomial tests)
Treatment Periods Nb of groups above 7a p-value Result
EE
1 to 10 5 0.363 Subjects play Nash
11 to 20 7 0.035 Subjects over-contribute
EI
1 to 10 7 0.035 Subjects over-contribute
11 to 20 5 0.363 Subjects play Nash
II
1 to 10 8 0.004 Subjects over-contribute
11 to 20 6 0.145 Subjects play Nash
IE
1 to 10 5 0.363 Subjects play Nash
11 to 20 5 0.363 Subjects play Nash
aThe column reports the number of groups among the 8 groups of the experiment having an average
group contribution above the equilibrium 7 (over-contribute) for the corresponding periods.
37Table 4: Over-contribution by subjects’ type (Binomial tests)
Treatment Periods Types Freq.a p-value Result
EI
1 to 10
Poorb - - -
Richc - - -
11 to 20
Poorb 7 0.035 Subjects over-contribute
Richc 5 0.363 Subjects play Nash
IEd
1 to 10
Poorb 7 0.035 Subjects over-contribute
Richc 5 0.363 Subjects play Nash
11 to 20
Former poore 7 0.035 Subjects over-contribute
Former riche 4 0.633 Subjects play Nash
II
1 to 10
Poorb 8 0.004 Subjects over-contribute
Richc 5 0.363 Subjects play Nash
11 to 20
Poorb 8 0.004 Subjects over-contribute
Richc 4 0.633 Subjects play Nash
aThe column reports the number of groups of poor/rich subjects among the 8 groups of the experiment
having an average group contribution above their equilibrium (2 for poor subjects and 12 for rich subjects)
for the corresponding periods.
bThe Nash-equilibrium for a poor player is 2 tokens.
cThe Nash-equilibrium for a rich player is 12 tokens.
dWe also study the second sequence of this treatment (periods 11 to 20) to distinguish the behavior
of the former poor subjects and of the former rich subjects.
eThe Nash-equilibrium for each player is 7 for periods 11 to 20 in this treatment.
38Table 5: Average reactions to the redistribution
Treatment: EI IE
Subjects becoming richera + 2.53 + 2.68
Subjects becoming poorerb - 4.53c - 3.71
aRich individuals in EI and poor individuals in IE.
bPoor individuals in EI and rich individuals in IE.
cThe mean reaction is - 4.11 if we eliminate an outlier that clearly over-react to the redistribution.
39Table 6: General regressions




























*** p<0.001, ** p<0.005, * p<0.1



















































































*** p<0.001, ** p<0.005, * p<0.1










Treatments: EE EI IE II
Group 1 5.28 6.13 7.90 12.93
Group 2 6.28 9.60 5.63 8.15
Group 3 12.58 8.85 8.20 7.78
Group 4 6.13 9.15 6.13 15.60
Group 5 8.78 7.88 10.30 10.10
Group 6 9.85 8.93 14.05 11.48
Group 7 9.38 18.35 6.40 7.43
Group 8 12.93 12.08 11.23 9.70
Mean 8.90 10.12 8.73 10.38










Group 1 5.13 6.73 7.38 13.00
Group 2 7.63 6.50 5.53 8.73
Group 3 11.60 6.68 9.40 6.98
Group 4 7.95 7.53 5.05 12.15
Group 5 9.53 8.25 10.88 6.98
Group 6 7.30 8.55 11.73 11.30
Group 7 9.30 19.55 6.43 7.33
Group 8 10.20 9.18 9.35 11.58
Mean 8.58 9.12 8.22 9.75
Std. Deviation 1.87 4.05 2.33 2.36




















1 15 4.75 6.1 3.4 -2.7 -5 -2.3
2 15 0.80 1.8 0.0 -1.6 -5 -3.4
3 15 5.05 6.5 3.6 -2.9 -5 -2.1
4 15 6.70 12.1 1.3 -10.8 -5 5.8
5 15 5.90 9.8 2.0 -7.8 -5 2.8
6 15 4.55 7.1 2.0 -5.1 -5 0.1
7 15 5.65 7.4 3.9 -3.5 -5 -1.5
8 15 4.50 7.0 2.0 -5.0 -5 0.0
9 15 6.40 8.1 4.7 -3.4 -5 -1.6
10 15 4.20 4.3 4.1 -0.2 -5 -4.8
11 15 5.30 8.6 2.0 -6.6 -5 1.6
12 15 9.40 11.0 7.8 -3.2 -5 -1.8
13 15 15.50 17.5 13.5 -4.0 -5 -1.0
14 15 13.25 17.5 15.0 -2.5 -5 -2.5
15 15 4.60 7.2 2.0 -5.2 -5 0.2
16 15 9.95 13.9 6.0 -7.9 -5 2.9
17 25 13.70 11.9 15.5 3.6 5 -1.4
18 25 6.45 4.9 8.0 3.1 5 -1.9
19 25 10.25 9.4 11.1 1.7 5 -3.3
20 25 10.20 10.4 10.0 -0.4 5 -5.4
21 25 9.60 7.5 11.7 4.2 5 -0.8
22 25 11.00 11.0 11.0 0 .0 5 -5.0
23 25 11.70 12.2 11.2 -1.0 5 -6.0
24 25 11.50 10.0 13.0 3.0 5 -2.0
25 25 9.15 10.2 8.1 -2.1 5 -7.1
26 25 12.50 8.9 16.1 7.2 5 2.2
27 25 10.75 9.1 12.4 3.3 5 -1.7
28 25 9.50 7.0 12.0 5.0 5 0.0
29 25 22.50 20.0 25.0 5.0 5 0.0
30 25 21.55 18.4 24.7 6.3 5 1.3
31 25 10.85 8.5 13.2 4.7 5 -0.3
32 25 17.10 18.7 15.5 -3.2 5 -8.2
Mean: 9.62 10.12 9.12





















1 15 10.00 8.3 11.7 3.4 5 -1.6
2 15 5.55 3.9 7.2 3.3 5 -1.7
3 15 8.25 8.0 8.5 0.5 5 -4.5
4 15 4.15 2.4 5.9 3.5 5 -1.5
5 15 4.90 2.1 7.7 5.6 5 0.6
6 15 9.55 5.5 13.6 8.1 5 3.1
7 15 5.40 4.0 6.8 2.8 5 -2.2
8 15 5.05 4.2 5.9 1.7 5 -3.3
9 15 7.60 6.1 9.1 3.0 5 -2.0
10 15 5.95 4.9 7.0 2.1 5 -2.9
11 15 14.50 15.0 14.0 -1.0 5 -6.0
12 15 9.25 10.8 7.7 -3.1 5 -8.1
13 15 9.65 9.2 10.1 0.9 5 -4.1
14 15 4.30 2.0 6.6 4.6 5 -0.4
15 15 9.40 8.2 10.6 2.4 5 -2.6
16 15 8.85 6.3 11.4 5.1 5 0.1
17 25 2.95 5.5 0.4 -5.1 -5 0.1
18 25 12.05 13.9 10.2 -3.7 -5 -1.3
19 25 6.50 7.0 6.0 -1.0 -5 -4.0
20 25 3.40 5.1 1.7 -3.4 -5 -1.6
21 25 11.65 13.7 9.6 -4.1 -5 -0.9
22 25 9.10 11.5 6.7 -4.8 -5 -0.2
23 25 8.45 11.3 5.6 -5.7 -5 0.7
24 25 3.45 5.0 1.9 -3.1 -5 -1.9
25 25 19.15 18.4 19.9 1.5 -5 -6.5
26 25 9.65 11.8 7.5 -4.3 -5 -0.7
27 25 16.35 17.2 15.5 -1.7 -5 -3.3
28 25 11.45 13.2 9.7 -3.5 -5 -1.5
29 25 2.60 3.3 1.9 -1.4 -5 -3.6
30 25 9.10 11.1 7.1 -4.0 -5 -1.0
31 25 16.15 22.4 9.9 -12.5 -5 7.5
32 25 6.75 8.0 5.5 -2.5 -5 -2.5
Mean: 8.47 8.73 8.22
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